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Chapter 4
4. Conditional vs. unconditional grants: The
case of developing countries
Roy Bahl
4.1. Introduction
Because subnational government taxation is not a viable option in
many low-income countries, the financing of decentralized services
often comes down to the choice between an unrestricted grant and
one with conditions laid down by the higher level government. The
central policy question that arises, and is explored in this paper, is
how this choice does or does not compromise the success of fiscal
decentralization.
We begin with some definitional issues and with empirical
evidence about the revenue dependence on transfers in low income
vs. OECD countries. Then we discuss the theoretical and practical
advantage of conditional grants vs. unconditional grants in
developing countries and give an illustrative review of the
practice45.
4.2. Definition and measurement
The term “transfer” refers to the case when money is raised at a
higher level of government and passed to the lower level by some
formula or ad hoc approach. We distinguish transfers from local
taxes.
The latter refer to the case where the subnational
government is empowered to at least set the tax rate, and thereby
has power at the margin to determine its revenue budget.
Roy Bahl, Regents Professor of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy
Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta Georgia. (rbahl@gsu.edu).
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There are a number of different kinds of public financing
instruments in the transfer category: “grants”, “shared taxes”,
“subsidies”, and “subventions” are but a few. Some of these are
designed to be centralizing in nature because they allow for control
of the use of these funds by the higher level government, while
others are decentralizing in that they pass significant discretion to
subnational governments. Intergovernmental fiscal systems in
developing and transition countries are more centralizing than
those in industrial countries.
On the financing side, this
centralization is accomplished by giving little taxing power to the
local governments, and on the expenditure side it is done with
mandates and conditions in the grant system.
4.3. Revenue importance
The importance of transfers in national financing systems might be
evaluated in several different ways. First, we may note that
transfers average about 6 percent of GDP in transition countries,
compared with only about 2 to 3 percent in developing and
industrialized economies (Table 1). Because of their higher level of
economic development, many industrial countries have been able
to adopt a more decentralized approach to governance (Bahl and
Wallace, 2005). That transfers are a greater share of GDP in
transition economies is not a reflection of their decentralized
expenditure approach but their general unwillingness to
decentralize revenue raising powers. In general, the share of
transfers in GDP will be larger if the overall level of government
revenue mobilization is greater and if lower level governments are
relied on more heavily for service delivery and smaller if
subnational governments are given more taxing powers.
Another way to make comparisons of the revenue importance of
intergovernmental transfers, and one that is independent of the
overall level of revenue mobilization, is to consider the share of the
central government budget that is allocated to transfers. As may
be seen from Table 1,
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Table 1. The revenue importance of intergovernmental transfers
As a
percentage of
GDP

As a percentage of
central government
expenditures

As a percentage of
subnational
government
Expenditures

Developing
countries (33)a

2.18

11.52

59.47

Transition
countries (15)

6.42

15.80

44.09

Industrialized
countries (24)

2.78

27.13

50.30

Source: International Monetary Fund (various years), Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook,: International Monetary Fund.
a Number of countries compared is shown in parentheses.

the industrialized countries allocate about twice as large a share of
their central government budgets to intergovernmental transfers
as do either developing or transition countries. Again, this reflects
the much greater commitment to fiscal decentralization in the
OECD countries.
Finally, we might compare the importance of transfers by noting
that subnational governments in developing countries are more
dependent on transfers than are subnational governments in
industrialized countries (Table 1). It will surprise few who study
these matters to see that transfers finance nearly 60 percent of
subnational government expenditures in developing countries,
though in fact it might surprise some that this share is not larger.
The share is smaller in the industrialized countries because they
have devolved more revenue-raising authority to their subnational
governments.46
4.4. Conditionality and the objectives of transfer systems
Higher-level governments make use of intergovernmental transfers
46 Note, however, that there is a very great disparity between federal and unitary
countries in this regard. For a discussion of tax assignment in industrial countries
see Bahl (2009).
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for good economic reasons, and for understandable political
reasons. The role of conditionality in a transfer system is bound up
with this economic and political rationale. The first principles of
fiscal federalism, where this rationale is laid out, are by now well
developed and have been taught to several generations of students
of public finance (Musgrave 1983, Bahl and Linn, 1992; Bird and
Ebel, 2007). But while these principles provide good general
guidance for industrialized countries, some important amendments
are needed to take account of the economic setting and the
particular institutional arrangements that often characterize lowincome and transition countries.
The theory behind the use of conditional grants is straightforward,
but implementation raises a number of issues. The problem lies
mostly in the design and management of the grant system. There
is almost always a disconnect between the goals the government
has for an intergovernmental transfer, the design of the transfer
instrument, and the implementation. Sometimes the disconnect
between them is so great that the objectives of the transfer are not
realized.
4.5. Vertical balance
Arguably, the principal reason for intergovernmental transfers in
LDCs is to redress the imbalance between the expenditure
responsibilities of subnational governments and their revenue
raising powers. While economic development has led to growth in
the expenditure budgets of provincial and local governments, it has
not led to a decentralization of taxing powers. The result in
developing countries is almost always an inability of subnational
governments to finance adequate levels of public services from
their own sources (Bahl and Wallace, 2005; Bahl, 2009).
The resulting financing gap (the vertical imbalance) for less
developed countries and for transition countries is usually filled by
intergovernmental transfers. As countries develop, there is a shift
toward asking subnational governments to raise more of their own
resources. In the U.S., for example, transfers finance less than onefourth of all state and local government expenditures, mostly
because the state and local governments have access to a wide
variety of consumption and income taxes. The same is true in most
129
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OECD countries where there is extensive use of subnational
government income taxes. Denmark, Spain and Switzerland are
cases in point. Among developing and transition countries,
however, most have not reached a threshold of comfort with
subnational government taxes. Subnational government taxes in
OECD countries are about five times higher than in low income
countries even after adjustment for GDP. There are notable
exceptions, of course, such as Argentina and Brazil (Rezende and
Afonso, 2006; Tommasi, et. al. 2001).
In theory, the vertical gap could be filled by either a conditional or
an unconditional grant. Those who advocate fiscal decentralization
will prefer an unconditional grant because the funds may be used
to either address expenditure needs in general or to lower taxes. In
the case of a conditional grant, the focus would be more on closing
the gap in particular sectors. The question of which is the best
choice will come back to the extent to which the goal is central
control of the use of the grant funds vs. addressing local
expenditure needs based on local preferences.
4.6. Equalization
Developing and transition countries are characterized by wide
inter-regional disparities in economic well-being. It is not unusual
for the average income in the richest provinces to be 10 times
higher than that in the poorest places. These income disparities
are directly reflected in differences in revenue-raising power. To
the extent that subnational governments are given more
independent revenue raising powers, these disparities will widen
because the more urbanized local governments have the greatest
taxable
capacities
and
the
strongest
administrative
infrastructures.
Countries do acknowledge the need for equalization of interregional differences in fiscal capacity in a decentralized system,
and they must rely on intergovernmental transfers to accomplish
this. Otherwise, the gap between subnational governments in the
quality of public services provided would be out of step with social
equity goals, and could be politically unacceptable. The design
principles for an equalizing transfer system are simple enough:
measure the extent of fiscal disparities, decide how much of the
130
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gap will be eliminated, and develop a formula that will produce the
desired equalization. This is easier said than done, apparently,
because the implementation of a successful equalizing grant
system is a challenge that few developing countries have met.
Most countries design equalization grants as general support
programs to reduce disparities in the capacity to finance local
services (Hull and Searle, 2007). This approach leaves it to the
recipient government to decide whether it will spend the money on
pro-poor services or tax reduction.
Conditional grants also are used for equalization purposes, but the
grant design is tricky. Much depends on the grant conditions that
are laid down. If the restriction is expenditure on a specific (propoor) function, and if eligibility is limited to poorer local
governments, equalization might be accomplished. If the conditions
have to do with matches from local funds, or preparation of
acceptable expenditure plans, lower income governments may not
be able to buy into the program.
4.7. Externalities
Another rationale for the use of intergovernmental transfers is to
stimulate the provision of adequate levels of local public services
when externalities are present. Left to make their own decisions,
without any incentives or penalties, local governments will
underspend (overspend) on services where there are substantial
external benefits (costs).
This situation is well known in the
industrialized countries, and it also holds true in the developing
countries. Conditional grants are an instrument that can be used
as an incentive to encourage local governments to increase their
spending on functions with external benefits.
Central governments sometimes read the externality justification
quite broadly to include both the need to take spillover effects into
account and to stimulate spending to support national economic
development or equity objectives. Sometimes the conditionality
may involve earmarking a transfer for a specific purpose.
However, it may also involve a local revenue matching condition or
a requirement that services be delivered in a particular way. Or,
the condition may be more general, as in a required mandate to
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limit spending on personnel or to cover only capital activities. The
condition may not even be on the expenditure side, for example,
the case of a grant that is conditional upon increased revenue
mobilization.
The design of an intergovernmental transfer system to address
externalities requires policymakers to decide on the size of the
grant required. In the case of a subsidy that reduces the unit cost
of a particular service, the question is, what is the amount of
subsidy required to induce the local government to expand public
output to the target level?
Government fiscal planners in
developing countries mostly guess at what the right level of output
might be. In fact, these underlying issues -- the size of the external
effect and the price elasticity of demand for the service -- are
usually ignored by fiscal planners. More often than not, the size of
the grant is determined on the basis of affordability. The resulting
expansion in output for the targeted function may or may not
achieve efficient levels.
A major drawback of cost reimbursement grants is that the
recipient governments may not spend the money for the dedicated
purpose. “Money is fungible.” If a subnational government receives
a grant of $1000 for primary education, will spending for primary
education be $1000 higher than it would have been in the absence
of the grant? Because these transfer funds and other revenues are
substitutes, the true impact of a grant may be hidden. Monitoring
becomes all but impossible.
There is no easy way around the
fungibility problem. Higher level governments in developing
countries usually try to address this issue by either limiting
earmarked grants to functions where the unmet demand is great
and there is no sentiment for displacement, by placing a minimum
amount of expenditures on the functions in question, or by limiting
local expenditures on such items as salary increases, new hires or
general administration.
4.8. Administrative justification
Intergovernmental transfers are thought to be a less costly way to
finance government because the central government can assess
and collect taxes more cheaply than can subnational governments.
Another often-made argument is that subnational governments are
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more corrupt than the central government, and therefore a shift of
responsibility to subnational governments will lead to a waste of
revenues. For these reasons, it is more efficient for the central
(state) government to collect the taxes and then allocate some
portion of the revenues to the lower level of government in the
form of transfers.
There are counterarguments against both of these propositions. In
fact, all taxes are not more efficiently administered by higher level
governments. The property tax, user charges, motor vehicle
licenses, and local business licenses are examples. The comparative
advantage of subnational governments in all of these areas is their
more intimate familiarity with the local tax base and with local
taxpayers.
The charge that subnational government tax administrations are
more corrupt than central government tax administrations is more
accurately stated as a hypothesis. Some researchers have pointed
out that corruption may be even greater at the central level
because of less transparency and because the amounts involved are
so much larger (Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado and Boex,
2007).
The connection to conditional grants here is only indirect. If the
real reason for constraining subnational government taxation is to
resist local government expenditure autonomy, then the central
government is likely to focus on conditional grants so that it can
control subnational government budget allocations. An
unconditional grant, by contrast, could give lower level
governments the same discretion as would an equal amount of
local tax revenue.
4.9. Political justifications
Governments also adopt (or reject) intergovernmental transfers for
political reasons. These reasons fall into three categories. The first
is that the central government is resistant to giving up the control
over governance that would come with giving revenue-raising
powers to subnational governments, because authority to make
decisions about the service delivery financed with these revenues
would be passed from central bureaucrats to provincial and local
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bureaucrats, and this would significantly dilute the power of the
former. An alternative to giving up this power, while not fully
rejecting the decentralization initiative, is to provide local
governments with intergovernmental transfers that carry
stringent conditions.
A second political reason for advocating intergovernmental
transfers is the goal of enforcing uniformity in the expenditure mix
and the revenue structure chosen. One way to restrain local
governments from making fiscal choices is to structure
intergovernmental transfers to limit local discretion. Third, a
transfer system may be put in place as part of a political strategy
to hold open the option of offloading the budget deficit on to
subnational governments. The Philippines is an example where
this strategy was used for a number of years.
All this said, the politics may also swing back and forth between
preferences for fiscal centralization and conditional transfers and
for decentralized taxing powers and unconditional grants. This
was the case in Russia where the Yeltsin years were a time of
advocating more power for the regional governments, whereas the
Putin years have seen more pushback toward fiscal centralization.
(Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace, 2008, chapter 7).
4.10. The practice: Conditional vs. unconditional grants
Every intergovernmental transfer has two dimensions: the first is
the vertical share, the distribution of revenues between the central
government and all of the subnational governments. The second is
the horizontal sharing, the allocation of the total grant fund among
the recipient units. The design of a grant system requires deciding
on both a structure of vertical sharing and a structure of horizontal
sharing. There are elements of conditionality in both vertical
sharing and horizontal sharing.
This paper expands on an approach developed by Bahl and Linn
(1992) to describe and distinguish among the different types of
transfers commonly found in developing and transition countries
(See Table 2). Clearly this simple two-way classification is an
oversimplification, because countries tweak the vertical and
horizontal sharing arrangements in many ways.
Still, this
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description of the architecture is good enough to make the point
that different combinations of vertical and horizontal sharing
choices can lead to fundamentally different types of
intergovernmental transfers.
4.11. The architecture of vertical sharing
As suggested by the columns in Table 2, there are three more or
less common approaches to determining the size of the total grant
pool (i.e. the vertical dimension). The total to be allocated may be
determined as a share of some central or state government revenue
source, it may be determined on an ad hoc basis, or it may be
determined on a basis of cost reimbursement.
Table 2. Alternative forms of intergovernmental grant programs
Method of determining the total divisible pool
Method of
allocating the
divisible pool
among eligible
units

Specified share of
national or state
government tax

Ad hoc decision

Reimbursement of
approved
expenditures

Origin of collection
of the tax

A

n.a.

n.a.

Formula

B

F

I

Total or partial
reimbursement of
costs

C

G

K

Ad hoc

D

H

J

n.a. Not applicable.
Note: For definitions of forms A-K, see text.

The shared tax.

Arguably the form of vertical revenue sharing
that is most in step with the goals of fiscal decentralization is the
shared tax approach (the first column in Table 2). In this case, the
central government allocates a share of national collections of some
tax (or of all taxes) to the provincial/local government sector. In
effect, this gives subnational governments an entitlement to a
share of national revenues and makes them partners in the central
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tax system. It provides some degree of certainty to the revenue
flow to subnational governments, and it could give local
governments access to broad-based and income-elastic taxes.
The choice of a shared tax, and the rate of sharing, will depend on
the commitment of the central government to fiscal
decentralization. Countries that are pushing subnational
governments to be important players in the public service delivery
system will choose major revenue sources with income-elastic tax
bases, or will share collections from all taxes with their local
governments. The cornerstone of the Indonesian decentralization
program that took effect in 2001 was a 25 percent sharing of all
domestic revenues. The Philippines allocates 40 percent of the
total internal tax collection (in the third preceding year) to local
governments. The proceeds from all central government taxes are
assigned to the divisible pool in India, and in 2003, the state
government share was 30 percent. In Pakistan, the provincial
share is 41.5 percent of central taxes. This approach is not an
uncommon choice for many developing and transition countries.
Tax sharing is nearly always distributed in the form of
unconditional transfers. The basic idea is to channel more funds to
subnational governments and not to provide an incentive to make
any adjustment to spending patterns. Central governments that
would like to impose stringent conditions on recipient local
governments would not usually follow the tax sharing approach to
vertical sharing, though there are some exceptions.

Ad hoc transfers. A second approach to vertical sharing is for the

central government to decide on a total allocation to the
subnational government sector. Whereas the shared tax approach
gives subnational governments an ownership of some share of
central revenues, the ad hoc approach sends an opposite message:
the center owns all of its revenues and may or may not choose to
grant some share to the subnational government sector.
This
approach to determining the vertical share often involves more
negotiation and political consideration than subjective analysis of
vertical imbalance, and both the approach taken and the amounts
agreed upon may vary from year-to-year.
Obviously, there are great drawbacks to such a subjective
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Chapter 4 – Conditional vs. unconditional grants: The case of developing countries

determination of the sharing pool. Because it is not transparent,
and it is subject to political manipulation, this approach leads to
uncertainties on the part of the subnational government sector and
impedes fiscal planning and effective budgeting. Rezende and
Afonso (2006) report that between 1996 and 2000, the amount of
ad hoc transfers to subnational governments for social services in
Brazil doubled. The ad hoc approach sends a signal that the
central government may treat the subnational government sector
as a lower priority use of resources.
In some ways, an ad hoc system of vertical sharing gives the
central government more control over local spending than any
other approach, because the full program may be terminated (or
expanded) at central discretion. Moreover, the national
government can change its spending priorities and delivery
methods without changing the expenditure assignments of each
level of government. Finally, the ad hoc approach allows for a
reduction in the subnational government claim on revenues as the
situation in the country changes.
In sum, the ad hoc approach to determining the size of the
distributable pool is the most centralizing approach to designing
an intergovernmental transfer system. It can feature conditional
grants, but there is an option to close down funding for a program
without concern for an entitlement of subnational governments to
a particular amount of funding. This approach is widely used,
even in countries such as Brazil that feature decentralization as
part of their development plan.
One would expect a centralizing ad hoc approach to vertical
sharing to be used in conjunction with conditional grants. In fact,
this often is the case. Examples abound of the ad hoc approach to
vertical sharing, as is described in Bahl and Wallace, (2007, Table
4). The most common type is a voted annual allocation to
conditional grant programs as is done in Tanzania and in Brazil for
health and education programs. The Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines is funded primarily by an
annual ad hoc grant program (Manasan, 2009).

Cost Reimbursement.

Under a reimbursement approach, the
higher level government defines a service for which it will
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guarantee to cover some portion of the cost incurred by subnational
governments in delivering that service. The major difference
between the reimbursement and the ad hoc approaches are that
the former are more established programs that are based on a law
and are not regularly redefined. Functions that are often targeted
are teachers’ salaries, health supplies, highway construction and
maintenance, and infrastructure projects.
Most developing
countries include some form of conditional grant in their transfer
system. (Bahl and Wallace, 2007, Table 5).
Once the eligibility and reimbursement rules are established, the
vertical share can be determined by simply adding up the
entitlements of the eligible units, i.e. the grant could be openended. But probably the more common approach is to first
determine the vertical share based on affordability, then “cut the
cloth” in terms of reimbursement and eligibility. In effect, this
makes the grant closed-ended. The cost reimbursement approach
is likely to involve a large number of conditional grants that are
controlled by the line ministries and are continued from year-toyear. Before 2004, Tanzania’s conditional grants were contained
in 21 budget votes (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). In
Australia, about 40 percent of transfers are made up of 90
conditional grants for both current and capital purposes (Hull and
Searle, 2007). In India there are more than 50 expenditure heads
for conditional grants to rural local governments (Sethi, editor,
2004).
Cost reimbursement grants can take many forms. They may
directly cover a percent of cost, e.g. 80 percent of the cost of road
construction and maintenance. Or, they may be implicit cost
reimbursement, as in the case of a conditional grant for primary
education where no specific cost share is stated. In the latter case
the tax price for primary education spending is lowered because of
the grant.47
The great advantage, and disadvantage, of the cost reimbursement
approach to vertical sharing is its conditional nature. On the one
47 If the grant money is not fungible, then there is no effect on the tax price since
the total amount of the grant is additional spending on that function.
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hand it allows the higher level government to specify those public
service areas where it would like to see increased subnational
government expenditures. So long as these transfers are targeted
on public functions where there are significant externalities,
conditional grants have the potential to be efficiency enhancing. It
also allows the granting government to impose certain standards
on service delivery and public facility construction, and thereby
helps to impose uniformity and minimum standards in the delivery
of some services. Conditional grants of this type might be seen as
moving the fiscal system part of the way toward decentralization:
it gives the subnational governments more discretion than if they
were simply spending agents of the center, but it gives the higher
level government some control over the use of the funds.
On the other hand, there are also important disadvantages to
conditional grants.
From the point of view of subnational
governments, such grants limit budgetary discretion and can lead
to “unwanted” public investments. Examples abound of local
governments being unwilling to maintain capital facilities that
were heavily financed by central government cost reimbursement
grants.
So, central fiscal planners are caught on the horns of an efficiency
dilemma. They can stay with the conditional grant and trust that
they can guess correctly on the external benefits, or they can give
an unconditional grant to subnational governments and then
deliver functions with big externalities through vertical programs.
As we discuss below, this is perhaps the major policy choice that
surrounds the use of conditional grants in developing countries.
Finally, the cost reimbursement approach imposes an
administrative cost on the higher level government, which must
monitor the program, and a compliance cost on the subnational
governments that must do significant reporting on their use of
funds and their adherence to standards. It is more cumbersome,
and more costly to administer, than is either the shared tax or the
ad hoc approach to vertical sharing.
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4.12. The architecture of horizontal sharing
The architecture of horizontal sharing
Four methods of horizontal sharing are commonly observed: a
derivation approach, a formula approach, a cost reimbursement
approach and an ad hoc approach. Following our argument that
the impact of a grant system depends on both the vertical and
horizontal dimensions of grant design, we note 10 possible options
for designing a transfer, as reported in Table 2. Eight of these ten
types of transfer could be structured as conditional grants.

The derivation approach A Type A transfer, as shown in Table 2, is
the “derivation approach” to revenue sharing.
Under this
approach, the total grant pool is determined as a share of a
national tax, and each subnational government receives an amount
based on collections of that tax within their geographic boundaries.
For example, 25 percent of value-added tax collections in China are
allocated to the subnational government sector, and the allocation
is made according to amounts collected inside the boundaries of
each regional government.
It is important to note that this is an
intergovernmental transfer and not a local tax, because the
subnational government has no control over the tax rate or the tax
base.
The derivation approach is practiced widely among developing and
transition countries, and there is much variation in the practice.
Derivation-based sharing is a way for subnational governments
with a stronger economic base to gain access to the more
productive central taxes. In this regard, it might be thought of as
an approach that is friendly to the economic development goals of
decentralization. VAT, company income taxes, individual income
taxes, and some of the productive excises are included in the
sharing base in various countries. In other cases, the taxes shared
on a derivation basis are more narrow-based and less productive.
It would be hard to say that there is a “common” practice.
This approach to distributing intergovernmental transfers has
some features that can be seen as positive or negative, depending
on where one sits. First, derivation-based shared taxes are
counterequalizing because the richer regions have the stronger tax
bases and probably the strongest administrative machinery for
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Chapter 4 – Conditional vs. unconditional grants: The case of developing countries

collection. The result is that, cet. par., the disparities in taxable
capacity between rich and poor regions will be widened under a
program of derivation – based tax sharing. For example, Zhang
and Martinez (2006) point out that 9 of China’s 28 provinces collect
70 percent of income taxes.
Second, derivation-based transfers usually are unconditional and
carry relatively few strings. Subnational governments do not get
much choice about the level of revenue they receive, but they do
have freedom in deciding on the expenditure of this money (unless
expenditure mandates are also present in the intergovernmental
financing system). On balance, derivation-based shared taxes
probably lead to more accountability to local voters for the quality
of local government expenditures than do conditional grants.
Third, derivation-based shared taxes might stimulate some
increase in subnational government tax effort, because there is a
link between the amount of tax collection in the local area and
revenue accruing to the local government. The basic issue here is
whether the subnational government has some discretion to affect
the level of tax collections.
Fourth, derivation-based sharing should produce more certainty in
local budgeting and fiscal planning than would most other forms of
intergovernmental transfer. Subnational governments are in a
position to forecast, with some accuracy, the year to year
movements in revenue, and unless the central government changes
the sharing rates, this enables a proper budget planning process to
take place.
The administrative costs associated with derivation-based sharing
are low relative to most other forms of transfer. Moreover, there
usually are not significant compliance costs imposed on the
subnational governments, because there are few strings attached.
Nor does the central government need to monitor the use of the
funds by the local government.

Formula grants A second common approach to the allocation of

intergovernmental transfers among local governments is the
formula grant. A formula grant uses some objective, quantitative
criteria to allocate the pool of revenues among the eligible
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subnational government units. The most common reason why
governments move to a formulae-based distribution is to gain
transparency in the distribution of grants. This creates a sense of
fairness in that all know the exact criteria by which distributions
are made. In short, formulas are meant to limit the higher level
government’s discretion in deciding how much revenue will be
allocated to each local government unit.
Three types of formula grants are described in the schemes in
Table 2: B, F, and I type grants. The Type B formula grants could
be the most in step with the goals of decentralization, if the
vertical shares are adequate in size and tied to growing tax bases.
This would give subnational governments a dedicated claim on
central revenues for an unconditional grant. Indonesia, the
Philippines and Pakistan are examples of countries that adopted
this form of revenue sharing, and in all three countries the base for
sharing is total tax revenues. The transfers in these cases and
under most similar systems are unconditional.
The other two types of formula grants are more limiting to
subnational government discretion. Type F grants (ad hoc vertical
sharing) give the higher level government maximum discretion in
setting a high or low vertical share and determining whether the
grant will be conditional or unconditional. Type I formula grants
will be conditional and are likely to reflect central government
priorities and standards for local public services. Certain social
service grants in Latin America are structural in this fashion
(Diaz-Cayeros, Gonzales, and Rojas (2006).
4.13. Cost reimbursement – conditional grants
Arguably the most common form of conditional grant is a cost
reimbursement grant (Type C, G, K). Irrespective of the way that
the vertical sharing is arranged, these grants imply some action by
the subnational government as a condition of receiving the
funding. In most cases, they are structured to reduce the cost of
providing a particular service, though there are other forms of
conditions as well.
A Type C grant would fix the vertical share as an entitlement,
based on a share of national tax collections, and then specify the
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use of the grant money. For example, in some Latin American
countries, a specified share of natural resource taxes are shared
with subnational governments but distributed on a conditional
basis (World Bank, 2005). The vertical share for earmarked
education grants in Argentina is a fixed percentage of national
taxes, and distribution is made by subnational government
payrolls in the education sector. The major advantage of this
approach is the strong guarantee that the grant money will flow
and that it will grow with the economy.
The K-type conditional grant (entitlement programs) may be
protected by statute in terms of the vertical share, whereas the Gtype conditional grants (ad hoc vertical sharing) rely on an annual
allocation from the budget. In both cases, however, these can be
thought of as sectoral ministry programs in terms of the objectives,
conditionalities and monitoring.
The horizontal sharing arrangement for conditional grants
typically has three features. First, the higher level government
specifies the functions on which the money will be spent, i.e. the
grants are conditional. Hence the local tax price associated with
delivering that function is lowered vs. a situation where there is no
grant support. Second, the degree of cost sharing may be specified,
i.e. the grant may carry a matching requirement. Third, standards
of performance, construction, employee qualifications, etc., may be
part of the conditionality in these grants.
Conditional grants raise two more general problems. First, they
can impose quite large compliance costs on recipients in the form of
reporting on the disposition of the funds. At its simplest level, this
might involve no more than reporting that the grant money was
spent under certain budget heads. At its more difficult level,
compliance may require reporting and verifying that expenditures
were made on specific budget subheads, certifying that
expenditures were made only on eligible projects within the local
government area, providing information on contractual
arrangements, etc.
Second, conditional grants can be problematic if they are not
coordinated. Most conditional grants are the responsibility of a
particular sectoral ministry, and in many cases there is insufficient
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communication across ministries. Sometimes, regional and local
(elected and or appointed) bodies are formally established to plan
and coordinate, but the success record here is variable.
The use of conditional cost reimbursement grants, and their rate of
success in achieving their objectives, varies widely around the
world. Countries seem to tailor their conditional grants to control
subnational government spending patterns in a way that satisfies
national priorities and political objectives. There is also some
evidence of regional copycat patterns.
In Latin America, many countries dedicate a portion of national
taxes to specific expenditure categories. More recently, there are
calls in many of the countries to loosen the conditions so that
subnational governments can have more discretion to meet
particular local needs. Among the industrial countries, Japan uses
a system where national disbursements are earmarked for a
number of specific expenditure categories.
Some conditional grants are designed with numerous conditions,
over and above earmarking, to assure the achievement of specific
objectives. India’s rural employment program has the twin goals of
providing wages to the rural poor and implementing public
infrastructure projects in these areas. The grants are matching,
earmarked for this program, and the services are delivered by
rural local governments. However, there are some stringent
conditions, such as the eligibility requirements for workers and the
prohibitions against using contractors and capital equipment.
4.14. Ad hoc distributions
The horizontal sharing of the total grant pool for conditional grants
may be ad hoc (Types H, J). That is, each year the higher level
government will decide how it will distribute grants among eligible
local governments. This is not an uncommon method for allocating
capital grants among local governments. The most centralizing
version of this form of grant is when both the grant pool and the
distribution are determined on an ad hoc basis. A popular method
of making ad hoc allocations is for subnational governments to
“request” projects and for the higher level government to choose
those that will be funded.
This is a variant on the cost
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reimbursement approach. Whereas conditional grants distributed
under a reimbursement approach tend to be programmatic and
have defined entitlements, those distributed under an ad hoc
approach do not. Under a reimbursement program, parliament
would appropriate a pool of funds to be spent on specified projects,
but would distribute the funds on some subjective basis or would
direct that the line ministries do so.
By almost all standards of a “good” intergovernmental transfer, ad
hoc grants fail. They are not transparent, compromise local fiscal
planning because they fluctuate significantly from year to year,
and probably would not be driven by clearly stated objectives such
as revenue mobilization or equalization.
One can point to some advantages of ad hoc transfers. From a
point of view of the central government, these grants are
“controllable” and are flexible enough to reflect the changing
priorities of the center. They might also allow the government to
move through a transition period from one grant system to another
without disrupting service delivery. Moreover, they might be
structured to impose little administrative costs, i.e. no formulae, no
conditions, etc.
There are many examples of the use of ad hoc methods of
distribution, though no two approaches seem to be the same. In
Brazil, social contribution grants are distributed among
subnational governments by ad hoc negotiations, but conditions
are attached to the use of these funds (Rezende and Afonso, 2006).
All annual grants to local governments in Thailand are distributed
on an ad hoc basis (Weist, 2003). Both current and capital grants
are distributed on an ad hoc basis in Nigeria (1999). Ad hoc grant
programs tend to be popular in smaller countries where the central
government feels that it has a good sense of needs at the local level
or where data to support a formula approach are not available.
Jordan and Malawi are examples.
4.15. Conclusions and summary
Conditional vs. unconditional grants from higher to lower level
governments is a choice that is driven by a nation’s vision about its
governance.
The more the vision includes subnational
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governments as being responsible for delivery of basic services, and
for the allocation of public financing activities, the more the choice
will tilt toward local government taxation or unconditional grants
as financing instruments.
The case of developing countries is different, and the
conditional/unconditional grant choice is arguably more difficult
than in the industrial countries. Administrative constraints of
subnational governments in low-income countries limit the
possibilities for general taxation and raise questions about the
service delivery capabilities of these subnational governments.
Moreover, there are macroeconomic considerations, i.e. central
government misgivings about increased revenue mobilization
powers at the local level and a fear that subnational governments
would direct expenditures away from high priority national goals.
By comparison with most of the OECD member countries,
developing countries have an unfinished public infrastructure, a
low rate of revenue mobilization, and a high level of inter-regional
fiscal disparities. The problems of designing an intergovernmental
transfer system are qualitatively different.
There is no comprehensive survey available to help identify an
international trend toward one or another form of transfer.
Moreover, “conditional” and “unconditional” grants are general
terms that refer to a variety of different approaches to
intergovernmental transfers.
The vertical and horizontal
arrangements that are used to share central revenues result in a
number of grant types with different impacts. This makes it very
difficult to generalize about the advantages and disadvantages of
conditional vs. unconditional grants.
Many countries have adopted revenue sharing arrangements that
feature unconditional transfers where the subnational
governments have discretion over how the funds will be spent.
These systems feature an entitlement to a share of national tax
collections and often are distributed on a formula basis.
At the other extreme are various forms of conditional grants with
earmarks and matching provisions laid down at the central level.
In some cases, the conditional grants give the subnational
governments an entitlement in terms of both guaranteed funding
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and a formula distribution. In other cases the funding and the
distribution among recipients is ad hoc.
The conditionality provisions vary greatly across countries. In
some cases, it is a cost recovery and earmarked for a particular
function. In other cases the restrictions that go with the grant are
detailed and involve significant compliance costs.
Central
governments argue that the conditions are necessary to ensure
efficient expenditure of the funds, but subnational governments
often see it as a harmful encroachment on local autonomy and a
challenge to the objective of fiscal decentralization.
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